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Abstract
We consider a dynamic framework in which generations are linked by educational background. In par-
ticular, individuals differ in ability to benefit from education, parental education and appurtenance to
a group (either a disadvantaged minority or a non-minority). The individual decision to undertake ed-
ucation is inefficient because people fail to account for the fact that their getting education increases
the chances that their children will also gain access to education. This intergenerational externality is
higher for people from the disadvantaged minority, provided that the difference in expected utility for
children of uneducated and educated individuals is larger within this group. This provides an argument
for affirmative action in higher education, in the form of larger subsidies to individuals from the mi-
nority group, which is exclusively based on efficiency considerations.
Keywords: Affirmative action, intergenerational externality.
JEL Classification: H21, I28.
1. Introduction
In higher education, affirmative action, or preferential treatment to individuals that be-
long to minority groups, usually takes the form of predetermined admission quotas or specif-
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Gerhard Gloom, Tim Kam, Andrew Leigh and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments.ic subsidies. Frequently justified on the grounds of equity, such policies are often seen as a
compensation for past or present mistreatments. Holzer and Neumark (2000), for example,
mention that, taking a very long view, it can be argued that women and minorities did not face
a level playing field in higher education. This view is reinforced by evidence they provide on
lower quality of elementary and secondary education for minorities in the US, which contin-
ues to disadvantage these groups in competition for admission to the better universities.
Chan and Eyster (2003) focus on a different rationale in favor of affirmative action in
higher education: namely, colleges and universities that value diversity of their student bod-
ies. Banning affirmative action in universities and colleges with these preferences, they
argue, will only result in their trying to achieve diversity in less efficient ways.
Generally acknowledged as a successful measure to achieve these objectives, giving
preferential treatment in higher education to individuals from disadvantaged groups is also
deemed costly in terms of efficiency, as it involves transferring resources from higher abili-
ty students who do not belong to these groups to lower ability students who do.
De Fraja (2005) is the first contribution to provide an efficiency rationale for affirmative
action in higher education in a utilitarian framework. In his model, individuals differ in the
potential to benefit from education, which is private information, and the distribution of this
potential differs across two groups: in particular, there is relatively less high-potential indi-
viduals in the disadvantaged group. The main result is that individuals from the disadvan-
taged group receive preferential treatment (i.e., pay a lower tuition fee and enroll to higher
education levels) than otherwise identical individuals from the advantaged group. If the gov-
ernment did not have an informational disadvantage, individuals with the same potential in
different groups would be treated identically. Preferential treatment then stems from the
asymmetry of information regarding the individual's potential. The less favorable distribu-
tion in the disadvantaged group makes it less costly to prevent mimicking and, thus, plays a
crucial role.
In this paper, we take a different approach and identify an intergenerational externality
that, under certain conditions, is larger for individuals belonging to disadvantaged groups.
The existence of intergenerational externalities that differ across groups has been proven by
Borjas (1992). Holzer and Neumark (2000) also mention community externalities and, in
particular, role-model effects through which educated members of a minority group have a
positive effect on the education of future generations of that minority group1.
Following these contributions, we assume that the decision of children to become edu-
cated depends, among other things, on parental education and on the quality of the group en-
vironment. The individual decision to undertake education is inefficient because people fail
to account for the fact that their getting higher education increases the chances that their chil-
dren also will gain access to higher education. This intergenerational externality is larger for
people from the disadvantaged minority as long as the difference in expected utility between
children of educated and uneducated individuals is larger within this group.
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generational externality is in fact larger within disadvantaged groups. As a result, larger sub-
sidies for students that belong to disadvantaged groups can be justified on efficiency grounds
alone.
Although most of the empirical analysis regarding misrepresentation of minority groups
in higher education has traditionally concentrated on the US, the phenomenon is indeed pres-
ent in many other countries. In Spain, only 1% of gypsies living in Andalucía attend higher
education2 and the problem of misrepresentation of minorities is likely to become more gen-
eral and increasingly important given the current trends of immigration, particularly in the
case of individuals with poor educational backgrounds. More generous subsidies allow to at-
tract more students from these minority groups and increase the probability that their chil-
dren gain access to higher education.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the model and highlight the
role of ability, parental education and appurtenance to a group in the decision of children to
undertake higher education. In section 3 we analyze the first-best and show that the devia-
tion from the optimum is larger for disadvantaged groups, owing to a larger intergenerational
externality. In section 4 we investigate the role of differentiated subsidies in order to inter-
nalize the externality. We conclude in section 5.
2. The model
We consider an extension to Del Rey and Racionero (2002) in which a disadvantaged
minority (M) and a non-minority (N) group coexist. Within each group G={M,N}, individu-
als differ both in their ability to benefit from education and in their family educational back-
ground. Ability, denoted by α , is stochastically determined at birth. For simplicity, we con-
sider that α is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1 in both groups. Educational background
of an individual is represented by whether the parent is uneducated or educated: e–1={0,1}.
Individuals live for one period. First, they decide whether or not to acquire higher edu-
cation. Studying entails a cost that depends on the appurtenance to a given group, the indi-
vidual ability to benefit from education and on parental education. We assume this cost to be
γ G
e–1C(α ), where the parameter γ G
e–1 represents the effect of parental education (e–1) and the
group environment (G) on the educational cost incurred by the individual.
Belonging to a disadvantaged group, individuals from the minority group have to over-
come more obstacles, which increase the costs of acquiring higher education. In the case of
Indigenous Australians, for instance, Hunter and Schwab (2003) identify a range of social
environmental factors, which include poor quality housing and residence in a household
where others have been arrested, which decrease the probability that a young person will be
attending school. On the other hand the presence of household members with qualifications
or who are attending school significantly increases the likelihood of school attendance.
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that failed to meet the distinctive needs of Indigenous students which have resulted in con-
temporary low secondary school retention rates and low participation rates in higher educa-
tion.
However, we assume that education tends to level the playing field, so that the gap be-
tween children of educated parents belonging to different groups is smaller than the gap be-
tween children of uneducated parents. For simplicity of presentation, we adopt hereafter the
extreme case in which children of educated parents of both groups face identical education-
al costs3. Accordingly, we posit γ M
0 > γ N
0 > γ M
1 = γ N
1 = 1 to reflect the fact that education is
more costly for children of uneducated parents, and this effect is larger for children from the
disadvantaged minority group, M . C(.) is a decreasing and convex function of ability (i.e.,
C’<0, C’’>0).
Productivity and, thus, wages are exogenously given and depend on education alone.
Higher education has a positive effect on wages, so that educated individuals earn higher
wages (wh) than uneducated individuals (wl). Individuals inelastically supply one unit of
labour. It is worth highlighting that we do not consider wage discrimination4. 
Finally, let uG
e–1,ebe the utility of an individual of group G, family education e–1 and ed-
ucation e. Thus, uG
e–1,0 = wl and uG
e–1,1 = wh–γ G
e–1C(α ). The decision to become educated or not
is made by comparing utility with and without education. For each type, characterized by
group G and educational background e–1, it is possible to determine a threshold value of abil-




At the threshold ability level α
 G
e–1, the cost of education equals the gain, in terms of earn-
ings, of attaining higher education. Children with given G and e–1 whose ability is larger than
α G
e–1will invest in higher education. Children of ability α <α  G
e–1will not. From (1) and the as-
sumptions made about γ G
e–1, α  N
1= α  M
1 < α  N
0< α  M
0.
At the end of the period each individual gives birth to another one and dies. Population
is thus constant. Given that α is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1, α  G
e–1 denotes the
probability of remaining uneducated depending on parental educational background, e–1,
and group environment, G. Under the assumptions made we can conclude that, children of
educated parents are more likely to gain higher education than those of uneducated ones
and, among children of uneducated parents, children from the disadvantaged minority
group are less likely to gain higher education than children in the non-minority group of the
same ability. The evolution over time of the proportions of educated and uneducated peo-
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Let π G
0 and π G
1 denote, respectively, the proportions of uneducated and educated people
of group G in each generation. Once the steady state has been reached, the proportion of ed-
ucated and uneducated people of each group replicates itself: (π G
0, π G
1) = (π G
0, π G
1)PG. The
vector of steady state probabilities is then: 
(3)
We assume that costs associated to education are such that α  G
e–1 is interior for all G and
e–1
5. 
3. The first best
We define the first best proportions of educated and uneducated individuals of each
group G, α~G
0 and α~G
1, as those that provide the highest expected utility. The government then






stands for the expected utility of children of parental educational background e–1 and group
environment G. After some rearrangements, the optimality condition for interior α~G
e–1is: 
(5)
At the new threshold ability level α~G
e–1, the cost of education equals the welfare gain it
generates. This includes the gain in earnings as well as the gain in utility of future genera-
tions. Since C is decreasing, α~G
0> α~G
1. Thus, at the first best, a higher proportion of children
of educated than of uneducated parents undertake higher education within each group. The
reason for this result is that the education of the children of uneducated parents is more
costly.
On the other hand, since, at the laissez-faire, the expected utility is larger for children of
educated parents (EuG
1 > EuG
0), all individuals who make their educational choice in the ab-
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0. Therefore, the difference between first best and decentral-
ized threshold ability is larger for the minority group.
4. Optimal subsidies
The government may subsidize education in order to internalize the externality. We as-
sume that subsidies can be dependent on group or ethnicity but not on the education decision
previously made by parents. To finance this policy, it levies a lump-sum tax T on all workers.
The objective of the government is to maximize
(6)
subject to the budget constraint 2T = Σ Gπ G
1SG, where SG, G={M,N}, represents the subsidy.
The optimal policy is characterized by the first order conditions corresponding to the
lump sum tax T and subsidies SN and SM. The optimality condition for T yields λ =1 (i.e., the
marginal cost of raising one unit of revenue is one since lump-sum taxes are non-distor-
tionary). The optimality condition for each SG is: 
(7)








0, it follows that SM > SN. Hence, individuals from the disad-
vantaged group receive a larger Pigouvian subsidy.
In our model, an intergenerational externality implies inefficient individual educational
choices. This externality depends on parental and group education, not directly on income.
Subsidising the poor (who, in our model, are the uneducated in both the minority and the
non-minority group), without allowing for different subsidies across groups, does not fully
internalize the externality. Investment in education by the minority group would be ineffi-
ciently low if they received a subsidy of the size of the one that internalizes the intergener-
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In this paper, we have considered a dynamic framework in which generations are linked
by family background, which is determined both by family education and appurtenance or
not to a disadvantaged group. We have identified an intergenerational externality that is larg-
er for disadvantaged groups provided that education levels out the playing field (i.e., exist-
ing differences across groups are smaller for educated individuals). This externality can be
internalized by means of Pigouvian subsidies, equal to the size of the externality in each
case. Therefore, larger subsidies for students that belong to disadvantaged groups can be jus-
tified on efficiency grounds alone.
Notas
1. Holzer and Neumark actually acknowledge that affirmative action could enhance efficiency, although their
focus is in arguing that efficiency costs are likely to be low (see also Fryer and Loury, 2005).
2. According to Asociación de Mujeres Universitarias Romís de Andalucía (Amuradi), Nevipens Romaní (Gypsy
News), No 381, July 2004.
3. The weaker assumption  is sufficient to yield the same qualitative results. This con-
dition can be used to determine an upper bound on γ
M
1 in terms of the other three costs parameters. The suffi-
cient condition, which corresponds to the limiting case in which C(α ) is linear, remains stronger than what is
needed if C(α ) is convex. The upper bound on γ
M






4. Holzer and Neumark (2000) argue that differences in educational attainment and cognitive skills account for
large fractions of racial differences in wages. The question is then how much cannot be accounted for (and
there is no great consensus) and whether the gap (which is often put at around 10%) could be explained by
other differences among races or sexes that are difficult to measure (like, for instance, non-cognitive skills,
etc.) but may have an effect on productivity, and that perhaps employers are better placed to know although
they cannot easily document their choice.
5. If α
 G
1 = 0 (i.e. all children of educated parents of a given group undertake higher education), then π
G
1 = 1 (i.e.
all individuals of that group are educated at the steady state). If α
 G
0 = 1 (i.e. no child of uneducated parent of
a given group attains higher education), then π
G
1 = 0 (i.e. no individual of that group is educated in the steady
state). If costs associated to education are low enough for the highest ability individual and high enough for




1 will be interior and the ste-
ady state will be characterized by positive proportions of both educated and uneducated individuals. We are
making this assumption when we assume that α
  G
e–1 is interior for all G and e–1.
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Resumen
En este trabajo consideramos un marco dinámico en el que las generaciones se suceden vinculadas por el entorno
educativo. En particular, los individuos difieren en habilidad para beneficiarse de la educación que reciben, en la
educación de sus padres y en su pertenencia a un grupo (bien minoritario o desaventajado, bien no-minoritario). La
decisión individual de invertir en educación es ineficiente porque el individuo ignora el hecho de que al adquirir
educación aumenta la probabilidad de que sus propios hijos también inviertan en educación. Esta externalidad in-
tergeneracional es mayor para individuos pertenecientes a la minoría desaventajada, siempre y cuando la diferencia
de utilidad esperada entre los hijos de educados y los hijos de no educados sea mayor en el seno de este grupo. Esto
proporciona un argumento a favor de la acción afirmativa, en forma de mayores subsidios educativos para los indi-
viduos del grupo minoritario, que está basado exclusivamente en consideraciones de eficiencia. 
Palabras clave: acción afirmativa, externalidad intergeneracional.
Clasificación JEL: H21, I28.
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